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We examine sources of consistent regulatory decisions in a model where reg-
ulators respond to mixed incentives, including career concerns. In the refer-
ence case, regulators act as "public servants" who strive to make the socially
optimal decision, given limited information and the opportunity to observe
the prior decision of another regulator. Adding career concerns, such as a
desire to avoid controversy or to implement a future employer’s preferred
policy, tends to reduce the degree of diﬀerentiation in sequentially taken de-
cisions, hence increasing consistency. Thus, it is possible to observe that the
self-interested career concerns of regulators give rise to consistency in regu-
latory decision-making. This type of consistency might lead to substantial
deviations from optimal regulatory policies.1 Introduction
Consistency is often cited as a good principle of regulation, both in regulatory
circles where consistency is a buzz word, and by regulated businesses. What
consistency means is not entirely clear, but informally stakeholders expect
similar regulatory outcomes from similar circumstances. Examples of where
consistency is expected include similar regulatory decisions across industries
(e.g., gas versus electricity), across jurisdictions (e.g., gas regulation across
states)1, and across countries (e.g., competition law across European Union
member states).
There are some sound reasons behind this desire for consistency. Consis-
tent regulation minimises compliance costs (duplication for ﬁrms that operate
across jurisdictions) and eliminates arbitrage (investment driven by diﬀer-
ences in how regulators behave). Consistent regulation over time increases
the regulator’s reputation capital and minimises regulatory risk.2 However,
it is questionable whether consistency should be an objective in itself: clearly
it would be better to have some good and bad regulation across jurisdictions
or industries than to let it be consistently bad.
This paper argues that consistent regulatory decisions might arise, not
from sound economic responses to industry fundamentals, but rather from
career concerns of regulators. In particular, we model a situation where two
regulators have to make a decision under incomplete information, and they
do so sequentially. Each regulator receives an imperfect signal about the true
value of the regulatory parameters and might be able to observe the decision
of the previous regulator. We investigate the extent to which the regulators’
career concerns can lead us to observe consistent, but bad decisions (that
is, decisions that are similar, but which diverge substantially from the social
optimum). Such bad consistency might result, for example, when a regulator
is concerned about the eﬀects of making a decision that is contrary to the
previous regulator’s decision, even when his information calls for a change,
for fear that it might adversely aﬀect his career prospects.
While our theoretical treatment of the interaction between a regulator’s
decision and his career concerns is novel, there is a largely empirical literature
that makes a connection between regulatory decisions and the characteristics
1See Breunig, Hornby, Menezes and Stacey [[2]] for an empirical assessment of price
regulation across state jurisdictions, industries and over time in Australia.
2For a comparison of time consistency of utility price regulation and monetary policy
see Levine, Stern and Trillas [[9]].
1of the regulator’s job. For example, Leaver [7] suggests that regulators take
actions designed to avoid criticism and placate special interests, especially
when their tenures are brief (hence career incentives arguably are more im-
portant). He ﬁnds in a panel of US state public utility commissions that
regulators with shorter terms in oﬃce review rates less often in periods of
falling costs.
Fields et al. [3] showed that when California insurance regulators were
no longer appointed but elected by popular vote, the value of the regulated
ﬁrms fell. Hence it is plausible that there was a public expectation that career
concerns (reelection by consumers) would change regulation.3 Scope for self-
serving behaviour arises because a wide range of policies, including those a
regulator might consider favourable to his career prospects, could be justiﬁed
to the public as objective exercises of judgment. Koray and Saglam [6] make
this point in their analysis of the Baron-Myerson mechanism for regulating
a monopolist, which relies on the regulator’s unveriﬁable prior beliefs about
the monopolist’s costs.
According to Klein and Sweeney [4], regulation of natural gas distrib-
ution in Tennessee seems to favour large customer groups and ﬁrms: they
observe smaller elasticity-weighted price-cost margins in larger markets and
for smaller ﬁrms. This observation is consistent with the possibility that
regulators might try to avoid conﬂict, perhaps in order to promote their fu-
ture career prospects. In the US electricity and natural gas markets, Knittel
[5] observes evidence for anticompetitive regulatory policies that suit the in-
terests of the industry . This is an example of the frequently mentioned
revolving-door logic, where the regulator may wish to please potential future
employers.
Conﬂict avoidance and preferred-policy targeting — which were identiﬁed
in the empirical literature reviewed above — are the two kinds of career in-
centives we study. We show that these incentives can lead to even greater
3In this vein, Lehman and Weisman [[8]] ﬁnd that prices of telecommunication leases
are higher in U.S. states with elected public utility commissioners. For retail telecom-
munications and electricity, prices in states with elected commissioners are found to be
either lower (Besley and Coate [[1]]) or not satistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (Primeaux
and Mann [[10]]) from prices in states with appointed commissioners. Using a richer data-
base of regulatory decisions over time, Quast [[11]] shows that the political aﬃliation of
elected commissioners may be correlated with the lease (wholesale) prices that they set.
Moreover, he shows that retail prices may vary with the political aﬃliation of appointed
regulators.
2consistency than optimal decision making with sequential learning. But these
policies are suboptimal, even if they are consistent. They do not make enough
use of the available information or are subject to bias.
2 Regulators’ Career Concerns and Incentives
We consider the case where two regulators make a decision on the same
type of issue in a predetermined order. We denote the leader’s decision by
δ1 ∈ [0,1] and the follower’s decision by δ2 ∈ [0,1]. The latter knows δ1
when choosing δ2. The socially optimal decision δ ∈ [0,1] is unobserved.
Each regulator instead observes a signal s1 ∈ [0,1], respectively s2 ∈ [0,1],
that is drawn independently from a distribution known to be increasing in
proximity to δ. That is, if the support of the signal distribution is S ⊆ [0,1],
then Pr(s1|δ) > Pr(s0
1|δ) for s1,s 0
1 ∈ S if |s1 − δ| < |s0
1 − δ|.
We consider three models of regulator incentives and later combine them
in a weighted utility function. These are as follows.
I-T h eP u b l i cS e r v a n t
This is the benchmark case where regulators attempt to get as close as
possible to the socially optimal decision δ. Publicly minded regulators want
to make the best decision in the interest of society. Hence they experience
ar e g r e tRI (|δi − δ|) that increases in the shortfall |δi − δ| of regulator i’s















I (|δ2 − δ|)Pr(δ|δ1,s 2)dδ.
If these regrets were the sole consideration, regulator 1 could do no better
than to set δ1 = s1,s i n c es1 is his best estimate of δ.R e g u l a t o r 2 would
also set δ2 to the best estimate of δ. However, he observes δ1 in addition to
s2.K n o w i n g t h a t δ1 = s1 is a dominant strategy for 1,r e g u l a t o r2’s best
estimate depends jointly on signals s1 and s2. For example, if δ is distributed
continuously and symmetrically around a single peak, then 2’s policy is d2 =
3(s1 + s2)/2, leading to a decision diﬀerence |δ1 − δ2| = |(s2 − s1)/2|.The
important point is that public servant regulators do not typically make the
same decision, since the follower has more information than the leader and
updates his estimate of the optimal policy accordingly.
II - The Copycat
This type of regulator is interested in deviating as little as possible from
the other regulator’s decision. The copycat regulator anticipates a penalty
RII (|δ1 − δ2|) that increases in the disagreement |δ1 − δ2| between decisions.
This is meant to reﬂect the government’s displeasure at regulatory action that
exposes it to arbitrage, claims of favouritism, and legal appeals. The greater












II (|δ1 − δ2|).
If these were the only incentives, then regulator 2 would simply replicate
1’s decision, whatever it may be, and maximal consistency (|δ1 − δ2| =0 )
would be achieved. If the regulators also want to act as public servants and
implement a good policy, it makes sense for regulator 1 to set δ1 = s1.F r o m
1’s point of view, 2 is most likely to observe a signal close to s1, and therefore
should be willing to emulate δ1. Upon observing δ1 and s2, regulator 2 has
an updated and improved estimate of δ. He weighs the incentive to copy
δ1, in order to minimise expected regret RII (|δ1 − δ2|), against the incentive
to implement the best estimate of δ. In the symmetric and single-peaked
distribution case, a decision diﬀerence less than (s1 + s2)/2 results.
III - The Yes Man
Finally, we consider a regulator, who wants to implement a target deci-
sion that is favoured by government or interested lobbies. Revolving-door
motivations, where regulators compete for future jobs at regulated ﬁrms by
being soft, fall into this category. The yes man regulator knows that a partic-
ular decision ¯ δ is desired by the regulated ﬁrms (whom he regards as future
4employers) or the government (who awards promotions and may have a pol-
icy bias). When the decision taken by the leader diﬀers from ¯ δ by
¯ ¯δ1 − ¯ δ
¯ ¯,
and that of the follower diﬀers by
¯ ¯δ2 − ¯ δ









III ¡¯ ¯δ2 − ¯ δ
¯ ¯¢
to their career prospects, increasing in the diﬀerences from ¯ δ.
If these regrets are the only incentives, both regulators will implement the
target policy and thereby achieve maximum consistency (|δ1 − δ2| =0 ). If
"yes-men" experience disutility from implementing a suboptimal policy (e.g.
because they may be exposed and penalised), they face a trade-oﬀ between
doing what is best for the public and what is best for their personal careers.
Both decisions are biased toward ¯ δ and likely to be more consistent than if
only public service mattered to the regulators. An intuitive reason is that,
whereas the regulators have diﬀerent information about the socially optimal
policy δ (due to the sequential timing of the decisions), they have identical
information about the target policy ¯ δ.
Mixed Incentives
It is our premise that career incentives are mitigated by a threat of penalty
when a regulator’s decision is too far from the socially optimal policy. The
impact of a decision may be revealed at some time after it was made, with
punishment available in the form of a reputation loss, a career handicap, or
simply personal remorse. Hence regulators balance career objectives with a
preference for the socially optimal policy, whether from idealistic or other
motives.
We consider therefore a disutility function that weights all three incentives
as follows:
















II (|δ1 − δ2 (δ1,s 2)|)Pr(s2|s1)ds2 + βR
III ¡¯ ¯δ1 − ¯ δ
¯ ¯,















I (|δ2 − δ|)Pr(δ|δ1,s 2)dδ
+αR
II (|δ1 − δ2|)+βR
III ¡¯ ¯δ2 − ¯ δ
¯ ¯,
¯ ¯δ1 − ¯ δ
¯ ¯¢
.
In the next section we set up a formal model, including a stochastic process
that generates the value of the optimal policy, and solve for the equilibrium
policy choices of regulators 1 and 2. We show that in equilibrium disagree-
ments in the policies adopted by the regulators diminish when the idealistic
"public servant" preference is mixed with career incentives.
3 Regulators’ Equilibrium Behaviour
We assume now speciﬁcally that the optimal policy δ is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. We suppose that the regulators obtain signals s1,s 2 ∈
{0,1},w h e r e
Pr(si =1 |δ)=δ, Pr(si =0 |δ)=1− δ
for i =1 ,2. Hence the signals are crude indications. For example, a sig-
nal might indicate whether a regulated monopolist is truthful or insincere
about its claimed costs. Under this interpretation, a signal that is equal to
1 suggests that the regulated ﬁrm might be reporting its costs truthfully.
The following lemma, which is proved in the appendix, characterises the
conditional expectations of the socially optimal policy for regulators 1 and
2.
Lemma 1 The implied expectation of δ, after regulator 1 observes a signal
of either 1 or 0,i s :
E (δ|s1 =1 ) =
2
3




6Regulator 2’s expectation of δ, upon observing 1’s action and deducing the
signal s1, and then observing the additional signal s2,i s :
E (δ|{s1,s 2} = {1,1})=
3
4
E (δ|{s1,s 2} = {1,0})=
1
2
= E (δ|{s1,s 2} = {0,1})




We further impose that the regrets are quadratic functions of the diﬀer-
ence between a regulator’s decision and the target under the incentive model.
Thus:
R
I (|δi − δ|)=( δi − δ)
2
for the public servant;
R








δi − ¯ δ
¢2
for the yes-man.
Therefore, each regulator chooses a decision in order to minimise the
associated disutility functions:










δ1 − ¯ δ
¢2
respectively




2 Pr(δ|δ1,s 2)dδ+α(δ1 − δ2)
2+β
¡
δ2 − ¯ δ
¢2 .
The equilibrium strategies, as a function of signals and observed behaviour,
are characterised in the following proposition. The proof is in the appendix.
















3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
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3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
¢
if s1 =1 , s2 =1
−1




3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
¢
if s1 =1 , s2 =0
1




3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
¢
if s1 =0 , s2 =1
− 1




3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
¢
if s1 =0 , s2 =0
.
The equilibrium identiﬁe da b o v ea l l o w su st ou n d e r s t a n dh o wt h ei n t r o -
duction of career concerns can aﬀect observed consistency. Note that the
probability that the signals agree is 2/3, and the decisions diﬀer in this
case by (1 − α − β)/12 (and by (1 − α − β)/6 otherwise). Therefore, the








(1 − α − β).
We have just established the following result:
Corollary 3 In the model above, the expected diﬀerence between the deci-
sions of the two regulators decreases in α and β, the weights of the career
incentives.
That is, we expect to see a greater degree of consistency across regula-
tory decisions for no other reason than that career concerns become more
prevalent. Next we illustrate the extent to which career concerns can cause
deviations from the optimal regulatory choices. The benchmark case is given
by (i) α = β =0 , and depicted below in Figure 1.I n t h i s c a s e , b o t h
regulators are just public servants and, therefore, set their decisions to the
expectation of δ, given their signals. Note that, for any α and β, regulator
2 can deduce 1’s signal from 1’s decision, so in equilibrium 2 acts as if he
8Figure 1: Optimal decisions in cases (i)-(iii)
observes both signals. Therefore, the expectations of δ diﬀer - the follower






3 if s1 =1
1









4 if s1 =1 , s2 =1
1
2
if s1 =1 , s2 =0
or s1 =0 , s2 =1
1
4 if s1 =0 , s2 =0
.
Decisions diﬀer by 1/12 when signals agree, and by 1/6 when they do not,
so the expected decision diﬀerence is 1/9.
If α =1 , there are many solutions, in all of which regulator 2 exactly
replicates 1’s decision. One possibility is that regulator 1 acts like a public
servant, basing his decision on the expectation of δ.B yc o p y i n g1’s decision,
2 ignores the additional information he obtains from his own signal, which is
9ineﬃcient. If β =1 , both set their decisions to the target policy ¯ δ, irrespective
of their signals.
When (ii) α =1 /2 and β =0 , i.e. regulators are partly idealistic and
partly conﬂict-averse (copycats), regulator 1 still sets his decision to the
expectation of δ.H i sb e s tg u e s si st h a tr e g u l a t o r2 will see a similar signal to
his own, so that the wish to emulate 1’s decision will not interfere with the
wish to be close to the socially optimal policy. However, 2’s signal shifts the
expectation of δ either toward 0 or toward 1.T h u s2 deviates a little from









4α +( 1− α)δ1 if s1 =1 , s2 =1
1
2α +( 1− α)δ1
if s1 =1 , s2 =0
or s1 =0 , s2 =1
1











if s1 =1 , s2 =0
if s1 =0 , s2 =1
7
24 if s1 =0 , s2 =0
.
This strategy is just a mixture of 2’s equilibrium strategies when (i) α =
β =0and (ii) α =1and β =0 . The decisions diﬀer by α/12 = 1/24 when
signals agree and by α/6=1 /12 when they do not, so the expected decision
diﬀerence is α/9=1 /18; half of what it was in the public servant case.
When (iii) α =0and β =1 /2, and the policy desired by the regulated




3β +( 1− β)¯ δ if s1 =1
1




6 if s1 =1
4







4β +( 1− β)¯ δ if s1 =1 , s2 =1
1
2β +( 1− β)¯ δ
if s1 =1 , s2 =0
or s1 =0 , s2 =1
1






8 if s1 =1 , s2 =1
6
8
if s1 =1 , s2 =0
or s1 =0 , s2 =1
5
8 if s1 =0 , s2 =0
.
These strategies are again mixtures of the equilibrium strategies when (i)
α = β =0and (ii) α =0and β =1 . The decisions diﬀer, analogously, by
β/12 = 1/24 when signals agree and by β/6=1 /12 when they do not, so
the expected decision diﬀerence is β/9=1 /18.
Figure 2 depicts the distributions of decision diﬀerences and their expec-
tations, with case (i) in the upper panel and cases (ii) and (iii) in the lower
panel. The height of each solid spike, labeled with the magnitude of the deci-
sion diﬀerence, indicates the ex ante probability of observing this diﬀerence,
which reﬂects the joint likelihood of signal pairs and associated equilibrium
decisions,. The expected diﬀerence is given by the dotted lines; it is greater
in the top panel (where there are no career concerns).
4I m p l i c a t i o n s
W h i l ew eh a v ea s s u m e ds p e c i ﬁc regrets and signal distributions to show that
consistency in regulatory policies increases in career concerns, the underlying
reasons are intuitive and valid more broadly. Since career concerns by them-
selves, i.e. without any regard for the optimal social policy, lead to identical
decisions, they bias the decision diﬀerence in any mixed model, where regula-
tors balance career concerns with the desire to implement the optimal policy,
toward smaller values.
If career concerns are suﬃciently important, i.e. α + β is large enough,
and regrets are convex (as in the example), the following general argument
for more consistency exists. For any weighted sum of convex component
(dis-)utility functions, the minimiser of the overall function is a convex com-
bination of the smallest and largest minimiser of the component functions.
The reason is that, below the smallest minimiser, all component functions
11Figure 2: Decision diﬀerences: (i) top and (ii),(iii) bottom
12are decreasing, hence their sum is decreasing, whereas above the largest min-
imiser all component functions are increasing, hence their sum is increasing.
The minimiser of the summation must be in between. If we transform the
problem for regulator 2 into one where the decision diﬀerence is treated as
a decision variable, then smaller diﬀerences minimise the copycat and yes-
man component than the public-servant component. This implies that the
decision regulator 2 takes in order to minimise his total disutility is closer to
regulator 1’s decision when career concerns are active.
To elaborate, suppose regulator 1 has already made decision δ1.O b s e r v -
ing δ1,r e g u l a t o r2 will minimise his disutility u2, which is a weighted sum
of three components, uI
2 (public-servant incentive), uII
2 (copycat incentive)
and uIII
2 (yes-man incentive). If regulator 2 were to consider minimising sep-
arately with respect to each component, he would match δ1 in the second
case and match the target policy ¯ δ in the third case. In the ﬁrst case, regu-
lator 2’s decision would normally diﬀer from regulator 1’s because 2 observes
an additional signal that either conﬁrms the direction of 1’s decision (hence
revises toward the extremes) or casts doubt on it (hence revises toward the
middle).
Translating 2’s action δ2 into the space of decision diﬀerences |δ1 − δ2|,
2 faces individual minimisers 0,
¯ ¯δ1 − ¯ δ




respectively. (The components are correspondences, rather than functions,
in |δ1 − δ2|, but we need only consider minima of the lower envelope func-
tions.) If all component functions have unique minima (e.g. are convex),
and provided
¯ ¯δ1 − ¯ δ
¯ ¯ <x , then the minimiser of the weighted sum u1 has to
fall between 0 and x, since all components increase monotonically beyond x.




is not straightforward, which motivates our informal discussion.)
It is conceivable that
¯ ¯δ1 − ¯ δ
¯ ¯ is large, if regulator 1’s signal indicates an
optimal policy far from¯ δ and the regulators care strongly about implementing
it. However, if career incentives are dominant, δ1 will be close to ¯ δ,s i n c e
regulator 1 knows that 2 wants to implement ¯ δ, and is therefore most likely
to match δ1 in this case. Thus 1 can meet both career objectives best by
gravitating to ¯ δ, and if career incentives are important enough,
¯ ¯δ1 − ¯ δ
¯ ¯ will
be smaller than x. Then the minimiser of the public-servant component is
largest, and must exceed the minimiser of regulator 2’s total disutility (with
active career incentives) in decision-diﬀerence space.
The argument is illustrated in Figure 3 for δ1 =4 /5 and signals s1 =1
and s2 =1 , with quadratic disutilities as in the text and ¯ δ =1 . The left panel
13Figure 3: Component functions of δ2, left, transformed into functions of
|δ1 − δ2|,r i g h t
depicts the component disutilities for diﬀerent values of δ2. The right panel
shows the component disutilities for diﬀerent values of |δ1 − δ2| = |4/5 − δ1|.
The minimisers of uI
2, uII
2 ,a n duIII
2 in the right panel are respectively 3/10
(since δ2 =4 /5 − 3/10 = 1/2), 0,a n d1/5 (since δ2 =4 /5+1 /5=1 ).
The largest of these is 3/10, the minimiser of the public servant disutility
uI
2. Beyond this point, all component disutilities increase, so the total utility
u2, which is a weighted average of the components, must also increase. Its
minimiser must therefore be smaller than 3/10, which demonstrates - for




|δ1 − δ2| if regulator 2 responds optimally. A similar argument applies to
other values of δ1 (provided the weight on uII
2 and uIII
2 is large enough),
hence in particular for the decision regulator 1 takes in equilibrium.
It is important to mention that there are other factors besides career
incentives that could increase consistency. While "bad" consistency (the
copycat and yes-man scenarios) tends to produce systematically smaller de-
cision diﬀerences than "good consistency" (the public-servant case), there
are confounding factors. In a single decision problem, highly consistent deci-
14sions may arise from information aggregation purely from the fact that both
decision makers have very good information. Then their strongly correlated
signals imply that regulator 2 has little new information, and therefore -
i nt h ep u r ep u b l i cs e r v a n tc a s e-l i t t l er e a s o nt od e v i a t ef r o mt h el e a d e r ’ s
decision.
Very bad information (i.e. reason to mistrust one’s own signal) would
also reduce decision diﬀerences as both regulators have little basis for devi-
ating from the unconditional expected value of the optimal policy, which is
half. The same behavior is exhibited by very risk-averse agents. They would
gravitate towards an intermediate decision (i.e. half), so as to avoid being
on occasion very wrong with a decision at an extreme.
5C o n c l u s i o n
When regulators try to make socially optimal decisions (public servants), the
arrival of new information is likely to change the optimal decision, and the
follower is expected to deviate slightly from the leader. When we add an
inherent preference for consistency (copycats) or a speciﬁc policy (yes men),
the follower has an incentive to ignore new information and match the leader’s
decision, causing greater consistency.
Hence one cannot be unguardedly optimistic about the observed trend
toward consistency, since it is likely to be inﬂuenced by career concerns. Such
incentives lead to suboptimal decision making that doesn’t make enough use
of the available information and / or is subject to bias. One would like
to be able to detect these inﬂuences empirically, but identiﬁcation is not a
straightforward task. Information quality (very good or very bad) and risk
aversion also lead to greater consistency, and their eﬀects could be mistaken
for those of career concerns.
6 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : . Each signal is unconditionally equally likely:
Pr(si =1 ) =
Z 1
0






Pr(si =0 |δ)dδ =P r( si =0 ).
15Hence the conditional probability of δ, given a signal s1 ∈ {0,1},i s :








The conditional distributions are:
Pr(δ ≤ x|s1 =1 ) =
Z x
0
Pr(δ|s1 =1 )dδ = x
2
Pr(δ ≤ x|s1 =0 ) =
Z x
0
Pr(δ|s1 =0 )dδ =1− (1 − x)
2 .
The expectation of δ, conditional on one signal, is:
E (δ|s1 =1 ) =
Z 1
0
δPr(δ|s1 =1 )dδ =
2
3
E (δ|s1 =0 ) =
Z 1
0




The probability of s2 after observing s1 is:
Pr(s2 =1 |s1 =1 ) =
Z 1
0
Pr(s2 =1 |δ)Pr(δ|s1 =1 )dδ =
2
3
Pr(s2 =0 |s1 =1 ) =
Z 1
0
Pr(s2 =0 |δ)Pr(δ|s1 =1 )dδ =
1
3
Pr(s2 =1 |s1 =0 ) =
Z 1
0
Pr(s2 =1 |δ)Pr(δ|s1 =0 )dδ =
1
3
Pr(s2 =0 |s1 =0 ) =
Z 1
0




The unconditional joint density is:
Pr(s1 =1 ,s 2 =1 ) =
Z 1
0






Pr(s1 =0 |δ)Pr(s2 =0 |δ)dδ =P r( s1 =0 ,s 2 =0 )
Pr(s1 =1 ,s 2 =0 ) =
Z 1
0






Pr(s1 =0 |δ)Pr(s2 =1 |δ)dδ =P r( s1 =0 ,s 2 =1 ).
16Then the conditional probability of δ, given both signals, is:
Pr(δ|s1 =1 ,s 2 =1 ) =
Pr(s1 =1 |δ)Pr(s2 =1 |δ)
Pr(s1 =1 ,s 2 =1 )
=3 δ
2
Pr(δ|s1 =1 ,s 2 =0 ) =
Pr(s1 =1 |δ)Pr(s2 =0 |δ)
Pr(s1 =1 ,s 2 =0 )
=6 δ(1 − δ)
=
Pr(s1 =0 |δ)Pr(s2 =1 |δ)
Pr(s1 =0 ,s 2 =1 )
=P r( δ|s1 =0 ,s 2 =1 )
Pr(δ|s1 =0 ,s 2 =0 ) =
Pr(s1 =0 |δ)Pr(s2 =0 |δ)
Pr(s1 =0 ,s 2 =0 )
=3( 1− δ)
2 .
The associated conditional distribution of δ is:
Pr(δ ≤ x|s1 =1 ,s 2 =1 ) =
Z x
0
Pr(δ|s1 =1 ,s 2 =1 )dδ = x
3
Pr(δ ≤ x|s1 =1 ,s 2 =0 ) =
Z x
0






Pr(δ|s1 =0 ,s 2 =1 )dδ =P r( δ ≤ x|s1 =0 ,s 2 =1 )
Pr(δ ≤ x|s1 =0 ,s 2 =0 ) =
Z x
0
Pr(δ|s1 =0 ,s 2 =0 )dδ =1− (1 − x)
3 .
The expectation of δ, conditional on both signals, is:
E (δ|{s1,s 2} = {1,1})=
Z 1
0
δPr(δ|s1 =1 ,s 2 =1 )dδ =
3
4
E (δ|{s1,s 2} = {1,0})=
Z 1
0
δPr(δ|s1 =0 ,s 2 =1 )dδ =
1
2
E (δ|{s1,s 2} = {0,0})=
Z 1
0




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . With the quadratic regrets, the integrals can














2 if s1 =1
(1 − δ1)
2 − 4
3 (1 − δ1)+1
















5 if s1 =1 , s2 =1
δ
2
2 − δ2 + 3
10
if s1 =1 , s2 =0
or s1 =0 , s2 =1
(1 − δ2)
2 − 3
2 (1 − δ2)+3
5 if s1 =0 , s2 =0
.












3 (δ1 − δ2 (s1 =1 ,s 2 =1 ) )
2
+1
3 (δ1 − δ2 (s1 =1 ,s 2 =0 ) )
2 if s1 =1
1
3 (δ1 − δ2 (s1 =0 ,s 2 =1 ) )
2
+2
3 (δ1 − δ2 (s1 =0 ,s 2 =0 ) )





2 (δ1,δ2)=( δ1 − δ2)
2 .



















⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩











3 (δ1 − δ2 (s1 =1 ,s 2 =1 ) )
2 + 1




δ1 − ¯ δ
¢2
if s1 =1










3 (δ1 − δ2 (s1 =0 ,s 2 =1 ) )
2 + 2











⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩











δ2 − ¯ δ
¢2 if s1 =1 , s2 =1










δ2 − ¯ δ
¢2
if s1 =1 , s2 =0
or s1 =0 , s2 =1










δ2 − ¯ δ










4 (1 − α − β)+αδ1 + β¯ δ if s1 =1 , s2 =1
1
2 (1 − α − β)+αδ1 + β¯ δ
if s1 =1 , s2 =0
or s1 =0 , s2 =1
1







3 (1 − α − β)+2
3αδ2 (s2 =1 )+1
3αδ2 (s2 =0 )+β¯ δ if s1 =1
1
3 (1 − α − β)+1
3αδ2 (s2 =1 )+2













3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
¢













3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
¢
if s1 =1 , s2 =1
−1




3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
¢
if s1 =1 , s2 =0
1




3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
¢
if s1 =0 , s2 =1
− 1




3 (1 − α − β)+β¯ δ
¢
if s1 =0 , s2 =0
.
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